Anti-communist analyst
Miroslav Dolejsi analysis
Part 2, The November 1989 Revolution
The Czechoslovak Parliamentary Investigative Committee's report on developments surrounding the
November 17, 1989 Revolution was classified and not released to the public. The investigation
resulted in the sentencing of a handful of insignificant police officers to a few months of jail time. The
investigation focused on brutalities committed on National Boulevard [in Prague]. The investigators
carefully avoided any mention of the political background of the revolution. The independent student
investigative committee created in response to the manipulations of the parliament was sidestepped.
[Note: The West understands the 1989 Revolution as an “anti-communist” revolt triggered by police
brutality on November 17.]
The aftermath of these developments was widespread doubt regarding the nonsense legend of the
“Velvet Revolution.” This nonsense is still being preached by President Havel and by the Charter 77
government. President Havel did not fulfill his publicly given promise that all files about meetings
between Havel’s group [Charter 77] and the communist government of Prime Minister Adamec,
followed by meetings with “the decisive political powers,” would be published. In the time frame of a
few months it became obvious that the brutal police response on National Boulevard was prepared
in advance and was meant as a signal for starting the revolution.
After the signal was given the initiative passed to Charter 77. This indicates there was coordination
between the communists and Charter 77 in preparing the revolutionary process. Immediately after
the brutality occurred Charter 77 took matters into its own hands by spreading a rumor [later proved
false] through student Drazska that student Smid was killed [by the police]. This inexplicable transfer
of initiative is a political mystery. It suggests a point of connection between Charter 77 and a special
faction of the Central Committee of the CzCP [Czechoslovak Communist Party].
Taking into consideration the doubts of the Czechoslovak people, the BBC shot a documentary
about the November 17 episode in which the revolution was depicted as an unsuccessful Communist
Party coup intended to remove Milos Jakes from the leadership, but the coup got out of hand. [Jakes
was General Secretary of the CzCP at the time.]
Guided by the light of this interpretation, founding Charter 77 member Jiri Ruml came up with a
proposal to reinvestigate the November 17, 1989 events. This was problematic because Charter 77
insiders conducted the investigation and presented the BBC documentary’s interpretation of the
“Velvet Revolution” as accurate. This version of events was politically acceptable because it
effectively covered up any connection between Charter 77 and the communists. The Charter 77 elite
could still be regarded as something it is not [i.e., a genuine anti-communist movement].
If the truth of about the November 1989 Revolution were known, Havel and his Charter 77
government would have to fall. That is not acceptable to the foreign [socialist] sponsors of Charter
77 who were building it up for 13 years and had no replacement organization acceptable to the
Russians. The government of Havel’s Charter 77 had to be defended and preserved.
From this analysis it is possible to present facts, putting them into chronological order, showing the
following sequence: After President-elect George H.W. Bush’s advisor, John Whitehead, visited
Eastern Europe in the fall of 1988, preparations for the changes were begun. In Czechoslovakia a
directive was issued for Charter 77 to step out and create a number of independent groups called
“independent actors.” These included:
SPUSA [Society of Friends of USA]
HOS [Movement for Citizens Freedom]
DI [Democratic Initiative]
Revival of Socialism [union of former communists and secret police STB agents of 1968]
Czech Children [monarchists]
NMS [Independent Peace Alliance] and others.
All these groups worked under the leadership of Charter 77. The objective was to create the
impression of larger-scale anti-communist opposition even though it was a false impression but
necessary for a propaganda campaign aimed at the West. [The Revival of Socialism group
consisted of communists and STB agents from the Prague Spring era of 1968. These were
supposed “liberal” communists like Dubcek and Cernik.]
In the Central Committee of the CzCP there was a group set up (which included Urbanek and
Mohorita) under the direction Hegenbart to handle meetings with the Revival of Socialism group. The
objective was to coordinate the removal of CzCP Secretary General Milos Jakes, by compromising
him and getting him out of the way. In his activities Hegenbart was under orders from the KGB.
There was an amateur documentary film produced that compromised Jakes by showing him in his
public appearance in West Bohemia. The KGB produced many copies of this film and sold it abroad.
At the same time, Hegenbart was isolating Jakes, who was not briefed about these changes so any
un-desirable response [from the communists] would've been eliminated at the beginning of the
operation.
Hegenbart was also the main person who in July and August of 1989 directed the communist
government's position toward the exodus of East Germans from the West German Embassy in
Prague to West Germany. In terms of co-operation between Hegenbart and the Revival of Socialism
group, Jiri Hajek [Charter 77 founding member] traveled to Austria just before the revolution to
discuss some last minute details about the date and form the revolution would take. [Jiri Hajek:
Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party before WW2; he was involved in merging this party with
communists after the 1948 communist coup.]
The November 17th date was chosen as the most preferable because it was the International Day of
Students and this would guarantee an international responses and, additionally, it was chosen
because it was the last available such day with the possibility of an international response before the
Bush-Gorbachev summit in Malta where the unification of Germany was on the table, requiring the
input of the Czechoslovaks.
The report published by the Independent Student Investigation Committee explains how the meeting
of Prague's College Council [about the demonstration preparations] was manipulated regarding the
participation of Vasil Mohorita. It is possible to add following to already known facts about the brutal
attacks on National Boulevard:
A) Approximately two hours before the protest demonstration of students, led by STB lieutenant
Ludvik Zifcak (alias "student Ruzicka”), all public transportation in the vicinity of the protest was
stopped in both directions. The Public transportation Company [state run] must have received an
order to stop all traffic at least three hours earlier. At the same time National Boulevard was cleared
[no public allowed].
B) Riot police were in position in Mikulasska and Konviktska [CZ police headquaters] streets three
hours before the arrival of demonstration to National Boulevard.
C) About an hour before the demonstration began, all buildings were locked up from Pernstyn to
National Theatre, even though the demonstration wasn't supposed to go that way.
D) Quick response police unit URNA [comparable to a SWAT team] was ordered to remain at alert
level three [its members were at home with their families but had to be on call] and received an order
at 10:30 AM to report to base; that is, four hours before the demonstration began. After they arrived
to base they were ordered to standby. After the unit changed into camouflage battle uniforms they
were ordered to wear red berets that are part of the dress uniform. At 11:30 the unit was transported
to Bartolomejska Street station where the members were briefed [about the operation]. This briefing
began at 01:45 PM and was conducted by three STB officers in civilian clothes, who also directed
the unit's operational response in the vicinity of National Theatre – at the time when the
demonstration began three kilometers away. This police intervention unit was briefed with large-
scale pictures on the operational plan of closing down the National Theatre and the use of armored
carriers with blades. This unit was instructed that STB officers would show them already marked
people from the demonstration that the unit was to capture and arrest. The URNA unit is trained for
quick response operations and not for ordinary public safety work. Colonel Becvar, who ordered this
special unit into action during the demonstrations, had to know how this unit was to respond. He also
had to know that using such unit for crowd control was unnecessary and not in accordance with law
and the internal regulationsof the Czechoslovak Federal Interior Ministry. The URNA unit was only to
be used at the times of public endangerment or against organized, armed resistance. Nothing of a
kind was expected to happen on National Boulevard. Colonel Becvar was promoted to his post by
Hegenbart himself, so it is possible that Becvar didn't issue the “illegal” order to use URNA on his
own. Somewhere in this scandal lies the real reason Becvar shot himself.
E) During the afternoon hours the entire leadership of Charter 77 left Prague including their families.
The only people that remained in Prague were Uhl, Benda and Nemcova. Possibly there was a
danger for them being arrested if Hegenbart was not able to paralyze all counter-measures of the
leading members of the Central Committee of CzCP and the Federal Ministry of Interior – who had
no knowledge of the operation and its true purpose.
These Charter 77 leaders all returned to Prague on Saturday noon. During that time and throughout
Sunday Hegenbart was once and for all able to remove the danger of a counter-stroke by the
Communist Party Militia that was mobilized by Jakes. The operational objective of the November 17
provocation was not only to remove Jakes from power, but also to initiate a tactical retreat of the
communists to prepared positions. This tactical retreat and its hidden mechanism was the subject of
negotiations between [Moscow’s handpicked] communist leaders and the Revival Socialism group,
beginning in January 1989. At that time Hegenbart began mobilizing actors, musicians and others to
petition for the release of Havel from jail. All the initiators of the revolution were communists or
agents of the secret police.
From the list of students who were active in preparing
the protest demonstrations and who later assumed leadership
in the student organizations, we find that they were solely
the children of prominent parents.
Eighty percent of these students had parents
at senior levels of the CPCZ,
Federal Ministry of Interior, Foreign Ministry,
or they were general directors in state-owned enterprises,
college professors and so on.
The slogans chosen for the protest were already inscribed in June 1989:
“We are not like them,”
“We don’t want any violence,” and variations on the theme.
These slogans signaled that no violence would be used against
the communists [a condition of the transfer of power]
and further guarantees were supplied directly by the students
and Civic Forum.